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It is impossible to anticipate when the next pan-
demic might occur or how severe its consequences
might be. In the 20th century, the pandemic of
1918 is estimated to have killed more than 40 mil-
lion people; the other pandemics were milder but
healthcare resources were nevertheless strained.1
If an influenza pandemic similar to the one that
struck in 1918 were to appear again, even taking
into account the advances in medicine since then,
an unprecedented toll of illness and death could
be expected. Air travel would hasten the spread
of a new virus and decrease the time available for
preparing interventions. Although it is not feasible
to halt the spread of a pandemic virus, it should
be possible to mitigate its consequences through
regional and national preparedness measures to
meet the challenge.2
In the post-SARS era, Taipei has established
an integrated system for responding to emerging
infectious diseases such as pandemic H5N1 in-
fluenza. A stepwise approach will be implemented
for active surveillance,3 epidemiologic contact
tracing, and containment of cases within special
isolation hospitals.4 In phase 6 of the WHO pan-
demic alert where there is efficient and sustained
human-to-human transmission, there may be an
upsurge in the number of patients seeking medical
assistance and existing medical facilities may 
become overwhelmed. The strategy will then be
shifted to disaster response and impact minimiza-
tion to maintain social order and integrity of the
healthcare system.5
In Taipei, there is a design of citywide traffic
control with task forces formed by special isolation
hospitals acting as contaminated hospitals.4,6
However, the number of influenza patients may
still exceed the capacity of the assigned isolation
hospitals and flood into general clean hospitals,
which would jeopardize the fundamental medical
structure. Therefore, establishing alternative care
sites (ACS) as part of the surge capacity of isolation
hospitals has long been a concern.7,8 Recently, sev-
eral articles have raised the pros and cons of a stay-
home policy as a replacement for ACS.9 However,
“expect the unexpected” being the principle of
crisis management, we should never give up on
ACS. In the incidence action plan of Taipei, ACS
has been integrated into phase 6 of pandemic re-
sponse with the module of traffic control bundle,6
while the concept of zones of risk has evolved
into contaminated special isolation hospitals. For
each working group, a contaminated hospital is
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surrounded by five ACSs, each with 300–500 bed
capacity. There are nine such assigned as part of
the disaster response surge capacity in Taipei.
Choosing School as ACS
There were debates about the best mode to con-
struct an ACS. Based on experience from 1918,
sports stadiums became the initial model for ACS,9
which was also adopted in Taiwan. However, dur-
ing serial drills, several pitfalls became obvious.
In a stadium, there is only one large open space,
which made traffic control difficult and cross trans-
mission among patients more likely. Patients from
all over the city converging on one location (the
stadium) also caused traffic jams instead of traffic
control.
Although there are other designs that created
ACSs from churches, aircraft hangers, hotels, recre-
ation centers, military facilities, shuttered hospitals
and stadiums,10 Taipei has chosen schools as ACSs
due to the benefits detailed below.
Accessibility
When there are patients who may experience rapid
clinical deterioration on the way to medical aid,
accessibility should be the priority. Schools are
evenly distributed throughout the city, and they
can play the role of first responder as a community
screening station, where initial assessment can be
provided with timely medical response.
Availability
As schools have always been the epicenter of viral
respiratory illness outbreaks,11 in early phase 6,
schools will be closed and temporarily replaced by
online e-learning to reduce transmission. As such,
the government can recruit vacant schools without
disrupting citizens’ daily lives. Schools’ existing in-
terior software facility and hardware can be trans-
formed directly into ACSs.
Safety
When available negative-pressure isolation rooms
(NPIRs) are fully occupied, the open space of a
school’s architecture without NPIR has been ques-
tioned. However, during the SARS epidemic in
Taipei and Hanoi, Vietnam, zones of risk were
successfully integrated into the design of isolation
ward without standard NPIR.6,12 The separated
buildings, floors and classrooms already in place
make planning of traffic control and zones of risk
convenient, and the large open space of the gym-
nasium or athletic field can be assigned as the
step-down general ward before discharge. A real-
life scenario is the Children’s Hospital No. 1 in
Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam. It was constructed to
appear exactly like a school without jeopardizing
the safety of medical personnel and patients.
Expandability
When further isolation hospitals or ACSs are
needed, these transformed schools can be repli-
cated in spite of the differences among schools.
Therefore, in addition to the pre-selected 45
schools in the current plan, all other schools may
be used, if necessary, to meet the requirement of
structural surge capacity.
Template of Traffic Control Bundle in ACS
Dispatch and transportation to ACS
As people ordinarily can choose where to seek
healthcare, changing people’s behavior with a
designed process of dispatch during an epidemic
is crucial. Through effective communication and
transportation, three categories of patients will be
received at the community screening station of an
ACS: those who come from home by themselves;
those sent by emergency medical services; and
those referred from outdoor screening stations
located at general hospitals.4 All patients are to
be assessed at the screening station located at the
school’s athletic field where open ventilation is
adequate and space is wide enough to avoid cross
transmission.
Triage into ACS
For those with mild flu symptoms, they will be
sent home with medication including Tamiflu.
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No definite diagnosis of H5N1 is required be-
cause we do not have mass screening technology
with sufficient sensitivity. For those with moder-
ate respiratory symptoms that require admission
to the ACS, patients will be further classified into
documented cases and suspected cases. Docu-
mented cases are patients placed in the contami-
nation zone due to positive rapid flu A test and
epidemiologic link to high risk exposure and
clustering. Suspected cases are placed in the de-
tention ward while polymerase chain reaction or
further documented test is pending.3 Special isola-
tion hospitals nearby will be the referral hospital
for patients who are clinically deteriorating.
Zones of risks
Risk zones (Figure) are designed according to traf-
fic control bundle with the following principles.
Next to the screening station located at the entrance
of the ACS, there are the gymnasium, decontam-
ination station, X-ray facility and first aid station.
Zones of risk can be distributed in separate build-
ings or on different floors of the same building
with the clean zones on the ground floor, the 
detention zone hosting suspected cases located
at the level above, and the contamination zone
for documented cases at the highest level. There
should be separate paths for healthcare workers
and patients, and also separate entrances and exits
between zones. Within each zone, classrooms
can be transformed into patient rooms with six
beds in each room for the contamination zone
and four beds in each room for the detention
zone. Six student desks are assembled into one
bed with cross wall steel wire to hang IVs and
separation curtains. Open windows will provide
ventilation. Alcoholic disinfectant dispensers are
set up in each classroom and checkpoints are es-
tablished at 12-meter intervals. Decontamination
facilities are also in place at the inter-zones of
each floor.
Conclusion
In addition to medical support, many things
should be included in a successful design of ACS.
The school’s public address and information
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Figure. Blueprint of school transformed into alternative care site with traffic control bundle.
technology system, in addition to mobile phones,
can be used for risk communication in the ACS
between nursing stations, patients, and families.
Facility and construction security, including elec-
trical safety, fire control and environmental protec-
tion should be checked in advance and validated.
Finally, a shortage of medical personnel to run an
ACS can be expected because the absenteeism rate
may be as high as 30–40%.13 A well-planned
training program for surge capacity of human re-
sources that includes retired medical personnel,
medical and nursing students, and paramedics
may provide a pool of extra personnel. ACS can
play a vital role in the consolidation of an infec-
tion control network and enhance our capability
for prevention and control of emerging commu-
nicable diseases.
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